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Stepping Stone or Dead End? 
The Ambiguities of Platform-
Mediated Domestic Work 
under Conditions of Austerity. 
Comparative Landscapes of 
Austerity and the Gig Economy: 
New York and Berlin
Niels van Doorn
Introduction: the austerity of domestic labour 
platforms
How to do more with less? This is, essentially, austerity’s onerous question. 
Its default answer, in turn, has been to defer, download and outsource 
the burden of being overtasked and cash strapped. As Peck (2012, p 632) 
notes, ‘austerity is ultimately concerned with offloading costs, displacing 
responsibility; it is about making others pay the price of fiscal retrenchment’ 
(emphasis in original). These ‘others’ are, frequently, marginalized 
communities of colour and the low-income urban neighbourhoods 
they inhabit. Cities, to quote Peck again, are ‘where austerity bites’ as 
it ‘operates on, and targets anew, an already neoliberalized institutional 
landscape’, but does so in a highly uneven manner (Peck, 2012, pp 629, 
631). What Marxist-feminist scholars have referred to as the ‘crisis of 
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social reproduction’ or, more narrowly defined, the ‘crisis of care’ is thus 
experienced differently depending on what urban household one belongs 
to (Fraser, 2016; Hester, 2018). In the face of enduring cuts to publicly 
provisioned social reproductive services and a ‘post-Fordist sexual contract’ 
that expects women to excel both as mothers and as entrepreneurial 
professionals (Adkins, 2016), white middle-class households have 
increasingly turned to the market to outsource their reproductive tasks 
(Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 2010). As formal and informal markets for 
domestic work expand, they not only generate income opportunities for 
working-class minority and migrant households but also intensify their 
social reproductive challenges (Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 2010). Moreover, 
it has been extensively documented how such feminized and racialized 
reproductive labour is highly precarious, un(der)-regulated and subject 
to exploitation by employers and labour market intermediaries alike (for 
example, Glenn, 1992; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; McGrath 
and DeFilippis, 2009). It is within this historical and socioeconomic 
setting that this chapter considers the market entrance of a new type of 
‘intermediary’: the on-demand domestic work platform.
Digital platforms amplify existing power dynamics and inequalities 
while introducing technologies and techniques that produce qualitatively 
new arrangements, conditions and experiences of work, generally 
referred to as gig work. Whereas I have elsewhere focused on the 
historically gendered and racialized techniques that render platform-
mediated domestic work invisible and devalued (Van Doorn, 2017), 
here I examine how formally self-employed domestic workers negotiate 
the engineering of their visibility, agency and income opportunities on 
two home-cleaning platforms – Handy and Helpling. As Ticona and 
Mateescu (2018) have shown with respect to the care industry, platforms 
use metrics such as ratings and reviews in combination with profiles and 
background checks to construct individualized forms of visibility that 
serve to market care workers to potential clients, ‘displaying specific 
qualities of workers in standardized and comparable ways’ (Ticona and 
Mateescu, 2018, p 4394). While these techniques are intended to foster 
trust on the clients’ side, the dynamically hierarchical display of ‘an 
abundant and always-available pool of workers’ presents a novel market 
interface that may nevertheless exacerbate the deeply unequal power 
relations that have historically marked domestic work (Ticona and 
Mateescu, 2018, p 4394; Hunt and Machingura, 2016). At the same 
time, platform companies are less compelled to ensure the institutional/
legal visibility of their ‘care professionals’ as formally employed 
workers, to the extent that most companies identify as labour-market 
intermediaries that match supply and demand, rather than as employers 
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or employment agencies. Although they provide clients and workers 
with tools for documenting worked hours, processing payments and/
or calculating taxes, and despite framing the formalization of a largely 
informal sector as one of their main value propositions to both clients 
and policy makers, platforms managing care and other domestic work 
strategically refrain from enforcing the norms and requirements of formal 
employment (Ticona and Mateescu, 2018). Instead, they dissolve the 
formal employment relation into a nexus of private contracts and user 
agreements (Tomassetti, 2016).
Accordingly, I argue that domestic labour platforms engage in selective 
formalization, or a set of business practices that formalize some aspects of the 
gig while perpetuating and sometimes aggravating certain conditions of 
informality that have long characterized domestic labour. These practices 
structurally benefit the platform and its clients, while disempowering 
workers, who are expected to carry all the (administrative, fiscal and legal) 
burdens of a formal labour relation but receive few of its benefits. Previous 
studies have shown that the boundary between formal and informal 
employment is not as sharp as it may initially seem and that labour 
platforms exploit this ambiguous terrain by technical and legal means 
(Ticona and Mateescu, 2018; Fudge and Hobden, 2018; Moore, 2018; 
Flanagan, 2019). For example, Moore (2018, p vi) notes that the negative 
characteristics of informal work are prevalent in large parts of the gig 
economy, where work is under-regulated, frequently unprotected, usually 
‘does not guarantee minimum wage’, ‘does not offer income security’, 
‘runs a high risk of discrimination’ and offers no occupational health 
standards or career-enhancing educational prospects (see also Adamson 
and Roper, 2019). In this precarious setting, gig workers run a higher 
risk of being subjected to psychosocial violence that can take the form 
of ‘isolating people, manipulating reputations, withholding information, 
assigning tasks that do not match capabilities and assigning impossible 
goals and deadlines’ (Moore, 2018, p  2). Likewise, in her historical 
analysis of domestic labour market intermediaries in Australia, Flanagan 
concludes that digital platforms have instigated a ‘paradigm shift’ in worker 
control ‘from one of dyadic to structural domination’ (Flanagan, 2019, 
p 65, emphasis in original). Whereas domestic workers have historically 
worked under informal conditions of dyadic domination, which requires 
obedience to an individual employer, today’s domestic labour platforms 
enforce a semi-formalized regime of structural domination where workers 
can leave a household when they please while remaining captured by 
a platform-engineered ‘market system’ that ‘provides the primary 
mechanism for worker discipline’ by setting opaque and non-contestable 
‘rules of the game’ (Flanagan, 2019). Echoing the previously mentioned 
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authors, Flanagan (2019) argues that such discipline is achieved primarily 
through platforms’ extensive and often punitive surveillance capacities 
as well as their use of unilateral ranking and rating systems that operate 
‘as a kind of “memory” that is held by the entire market’ rather than by 
individual employers (Flanagan, 2019, p 66).
What this study adds to the literature on gig work, and specifically 
to the still understudied topic of platform-mediated domestic labour 
(Ticona and Mateescu, 2018), is a cross-national comparative analysis of 
how nominally self-employed cleaners in New York City (NYC) and 
Berlin negotiate these conditions of structural domination and selectively 
imposed informality. Critically, I understand structural domination not 
as a totalizing arrangement but, rather, as a pressured space that leaves 
just enough wiggle room for people to improvise changes and switch 
gears, if not directions and destinations. What matters here is how 
‘structural domination’ – as an abstract category with descriptive and 
evaluative currency insofar as it is derived from concrete impediments and 
inequalities – is articulated on specific platforms operating in particular 
urban labour markets populated by low-wage workers whose dependency 
on and approach to platform labour vary considerably. Similarly, as Baines 
and Cunningham write in Chapter 1 of this volume, austerity is at once 
‘a global phenomenon with continuities across national contexts’ and a 
‘lived, local experience’. While I will briefly mention some national and 
urban austerity policies, this chapter is primarily concerned with how the 
logics of austerity are scaled down to the everyday practices of platform 
companies and gig workers.
One reason why austerity policies have seen such a widespread – if 
uneven – uptake across nations and regions is because they not only 
scaffold a political and socioeconomic project of retrenchment but also 
have a strong moral dimension (Muehlebach, 2016). In the words of 
Baines and Cunningham, again, austerity persuades as ‘an ideological 
frame that encourages sacrifice and lowered expectations from working 
people and average citizens, with the promise of improvements at some 
undefined point in the future’. In certain ways, as I will show, platform 
labour satisfies austerity’s moral imperative to a tee: it is a form of 
sacrificial labour that pulls itself up by its own bootstraps in the hope 
that the hard work and risk taking will pay off, either by turning the gig 
into a sustainable occupation or by buying enough time to transition 
into something better. Yet it will also become clear that labour platforms 
can enter people’s life as a gift, making them feel like they have won 
the lottery. For while it is true that the gig economy’s business model 
is predicated on austerity logics, to the extent that its two central tenets 
are risk offloading and continuous accounting, platform companies 
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are also notorious for burning through massive amounts of venture 
capital in their quest to achieve scale. The immediate impact of this 
pursuit on many gig workers has been one of relative – and short-lived 
– splendour, as they eagerly collect sign-up bonuses and enjoy initial 
payouts higher than any previously received wage. Platform labour’s 
link to austerity is thus not a straightforward matter, as it is rife with 
ambivalence and contradictions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured into three sections. The next 
section situates Handy and Helpling in the socioeconomic context of two 
of their main markets, respectively NYC and Berlin, which both have 
been at the vanguard of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012). It also provides 
a brief overview of the research design. The following sections then offer 
an ethnographic account that relays the experiences of this chapter’s two 
protagonists: Kenny, an African American Handy Pro; and Kostas, a Greek 
Helpling cleaner. The third section reflects on these experiences and offers 
some concluding remarks.
Situating the platforms
Handy in New York City
New York City’s extensive welfare infrastructure became the target of 
politicians and bankers in 1975, when a major fiscal crisis nearly resulted 
in municipal bankruptcy (Phillips-Fein, 2017). The far-reaching austerity 
measures imposed by the financial sector to teach public officials a 
lesson in fiscal responsibility radically remade New York City. A year 
before Clinton’s 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act, Mayor Giuliani’s Work Experience Program had already forced 
unemployed New Yorkers off the city’s welfare rolls and into poorly 
remunerated public sector jobs (Krinsky, 2007). The city’s income and 
wealth inequality ballooned and has since only continued to grow, 
resulting in an exceedingly polarized environment where a massive 
low-wage service sector caters to a class of highly paid white-collar 
professionals (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003). This sector is sustained 
by the precarious labour of predominantly African American and Latinx 
workers whose low wages are frequently subsidized by food stamps and 
other forms of public ‘work support’ that bolster low-road labour practices 
(Dickinson, 2016). Domestic services constitute a large and growing 
industry within the city’s broader low-wage sector, composed of formal 
and informal markets where immigrants and women of colour seek work 
that is typically isolated and ‘only partly covered by core employment 
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and labour laws’ on federal and New York State levels (McGrath and 
DeFilippis, 2009, p 74). While exclusion from such laws was redressed 
when the New York Domestic Workers Bill of Rights passed the state 
legislature in 2010, after a six-year grassroots campaign (Burnham and 
Theodore, 2012), its enforceability remains a serious issue and (putatively) 
self-employed workers are exempt.
This exemption from statutory labour laws is likely to be the 
reason why Handy classified its cleaners (which the company calls 
‘Professionals’ or ‘Pros’) as independent contractors when it entered 
the NYC market in 2012, and why it continues to lobby the state 
legislature to pass a Bill that would legally cement this status (Pinto 
et al, 2019). Now operating in over 450 locations in the US as well 
as some cities in Canada and the UK,1 Handy markets its extended 
range of home services as affordable and reliable to potential customers 
while highlighting ‘great pay’, a ‘flexible schedule’ and ‘easy payments’ 
as reasons to become a Pro.2 Noting that it ‘is not an employer, but 
simply connects independent service professionals with customers’, it 
charges a ‘trust and support fee’ for this matching service but also takes 
a significant cut (20–50 per cent, depending on the source consulted)3 
from each booking. Meanwhile, the payment NYC Pros receive is 
structured into four rolling tiers – $15, $17, $20 and $22 – that each 
come with a specific target regarding the number of jobs completed 
and average customer rating over a 28-day period.4 All Pros have a 
basic profile showing their average rating, jobs completed, reviews and 
an optional photo, but they can also purchase a Premium account for 
$8 per week that allows them to add biographical information and a 
Premium badge – among other privileges.5 Finally, the company deploys 
an elaborate system of disciplinary fees that ‘are easy to incur, can be 
hard to avoid, and seriously destabilise the income streams […] cleaners 
are trying to establish and maintain’ (Van Doorn, 2018).6
Between February and September 2018, I conducted 22 semi-structured 
interviews with Handy cleaners in NYC.7 Participant recruitment was 
challenging, due to the isolated and hidden nature of domestic cleaning, 
and happened mostly online (on Craigslist, Facebook and LinkedIn), 
where possible augmented through snowball sampling. Interviews 
took place in public places and lasted between approximately 50 and 
150 minutes. The participant sample consisted mostly of women (15) 
and African Americans (15), with African American women making up 
the largest contingent (10), followed by African American men (5). The 
sample further included two white men, two white women, two Latina 
women and an Asian American woman. Participants were not consistently 
asked to disclose their age, but most were in their 20s and 30s.
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Helpling in Berlin
At the start of the 21st century, Berlin’s economic downturn converted 
into a fully fledged fiscal crisis as it became apparent that the city’s Senate 
had allowed a large public banking consortium to ‘engage in dubious 
real estate speculations and almost go bankrupt in 2001’ (Bernt et al, 
2013, p 127). In what came to be known as the ‘Berlin banking scandal’, 
the Senate decided to bail out the consortium and thereby created an 
‘extreme budgetary emergency’ that ‘permanently changed the framework 
of Berlin’s urban politics’ by legitimizing enduring austerity measures 
and privatizations aimed at reducing the city’s enormous deficits (Bernt 
et al, 2013, p 16). It was in this austere urban environment that the far-
reaching federal ‘Hartz reforms’ were rolled out between January 2003 and 
January 2005, aiming to reduce unemployment and welfare dependency. 
While these workfare reforms did reduce national unemployment rates, 
they also increased income inequality and job insecurity by deregulating 
temporary and non-standard work arrangements – generating high 
volumes of publicly subsidized low-wage jobs – while leaving the core 
labour market untouched (Chih-Mei, 2018). Although Berlin’s income 
and wealth inequalities are benign compared to NYC’s, the city thus 
also experienced an intensification of labour market dualization that has 
been compounded by rapid gentrification and exploding rents (Bernt 
et al, 2013).
Having reinvented itself as Europe’s rising tech and creative industries 
hub, Berlin annually attracts (tens of) thousands of foreign young 
professionals.8 When failing to land a job in their field, these hopefuls 
either return home or join the ranks of other labour migrants and refugees 
whose ‘outsider’ status and lack of German-language skills drastically 
reduce their income opportunities and push them into precarious, often 
informal occupations such as home cleaning. As in the US, domestic work 
in Germany is characterized by informality and is mainly performed by 
immigrant women – in this case predominantly from Eastern Europe, 
Asia and Latin America (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010; Trebilcock, 
2018). While, officially, domestic workers are included in most of the 
nation’s labour laws (one notable exception being occupational health 
and safety regulation), and Germany ratified the International Labour 
Organization’s Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention in 2013, 
there are ‘inconsistencies and paradoxes between the official welfare state 
policy on domestic work and the unofficial reality of a feminized work sector 
which lacks rules on workers’ and clients’ protection’ (Lutz and Palenga-
Möllenbeck, 2010, p 420, emphasis in original). Similar to the situation 
in NYC, the lack of regulatory oversight and enforcement, combined 
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with the rise of self-employment, in this sector fuels these inconsistencies 
(Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010).
Helpling, founded in Berlin in 2014, has thrived under these conditions 
and publicly promotes its platform as an antidote to Germany’s large 
‘black market’ in domestic services (Höhne, 2017), while accelerating 
the self-employment trend by classifying its cleaners as independent 
contractors. Active in over 200  cities in ten countries across three 
continents, Helpling’s operations vary (slightly) per country. In Germany, 
the company promotes its platform to cleaners by highlighting ‘complete 
flexibility’ with respect to work scheduling, the presence of a ‘personal 
point of contact’ and the ability to ‘determine your own price’.9 Whereas 
Helpling started out with a set hourly wage (€11 in its Berlin market), it 
switched to cleaner-determined rates in 2018 – likely to avoid potential 
misclassification lawsuits. Although its commissions vary per market and 
type of service, the company takes between 25 and 33 per cent from 
the amount a Berlin-based customer pays for a cleaning. The platform 
encourages cleaners to add personal information to their profile, which 
otherwise includes one’s hourly rate, average rating, reviews, number of 
jobs completed and one’s ‘verification level’ (contingent on the submission 
of a business licence and proof of a police check). Customers can either 
browse profiles and select a preferred number of cleaners directly or let 
Helpling make the match. To reduce cancellations and increase cleaners’ 
‘reliability’, the platform used to deploy a Performance Score, but this 
score has been discontinued and from May 2019 Helpling – mimicking 
Handy – switched to a disciplinary fee system for cleaners and customers 
who transgress its rules.
In the period between October 2018 and June 2019, I conducted 
25  semi-structured interviews with Berlin-based Helpling cleaners. 
Participant recruitment again happened mostly on Craigslist, Facebook 
and LinkedIn, but snowball sampling played a bigger role in Berlin. 
Interviews took place in public places and lasted between approximately 
60 and 140 minutes. Save for one German cleaner, the participant sample 
consists solely of migrants who came to Berlin to pursue education, work 
and/or asylum. The sample particularly reflects the large population of 
young Chileans and Argentineans who reside in the city on a one-year 
‘working holiday’ visa and sign each other up for Helpling (n = 10). 
Other cleaners came from various Southern/Eastern European countries, 
Brazil, India, Syria, South Africa and Nigeria. Men (13) slightly 
outnumbered women (12) in the sample, which deviates from the gender 
distribution within Germany’s overall domestic worker population but 
reflects how digital platforms have made cleaning work more palatable 
to migrant men.
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As the next section demonstrates, drawing on Kenny’s and Kostas’s 
stories,10 both platforms can function as vital lifelines for minority and 
migrant workers who find themselves in difficult circumstances. However, 
as they spend more time working through these platforms, it becomes 
clear that the companies governing them do not have cleaners’ best 
interests in mind. Faced with deteriorating and increasingly punitive 
working conditions in which platform companies offload various forms 
of risk while continuing to extract rent from each service transaction, 
cleaners like Kenny and Kostas repeatedly have to figure out how to 
respond. Although small acts of resistance and risk absorption allow 
them to remain active on the platform, its engineered inequities and 
enforced austerity also motivate cleaners to experiment with informal 
work arrangements made possible by the platform but taking place beyond 
its control. Whereas such experimentation appeals to someone like Kenny, 
who sees a world of entrepreneurial opportunity, for Kostas it rather 
forms a gateway to another life, one relieved from the burdens of being 
a domestic cleaner.
A much-needed resource: Kenny’s story
Kenny says he can defend Handy all day long if he has to. The way he 
sees things, “you gotta think on Handy’s end” because they are a smart 
company that allows you to make good money as long as you work 
hard. Kenny is an African American man in his mid-40s who grew up in 
Brooklyn but now lives in a remote part of Queens that is still affordable, 
which means that he has to travel about 90 minutes to get to Manhattan, 
where most of his clients live. It’s a lot of travel time each day, for which 
he is not compensated, yet he doesn’t really mind because the trains 
are relatively cheap as long as you stay within the five boroughs. He 
is good at his job, as can be gleaned from the 4.8 rating and glowing 
reviews on his profile, which he is quick to refer to when discussing his 
work experiences over the past two years. Handy entered his life at an 
opportune moment and helped him get back on his feet, something for 
which he remains deeply grateful. Nearly three years ago, he “got into 
trouble” at home and his girlfriend at the time put him out. Suddenly 
homeless, he decided to check into a shelter because he didn’t want to 
burden his friends. There he was told that he needed to be working if he 
wanted to get overnight passes or support with his housing search, which 
is when he remembered his ex-girlfriend – and mother of three of his 
seven kids – telling him about Handy. The problem was that, as she had 
warned him, they “don’t take felons”, and Kenny had spent 18 months 
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in prison for a felony conviction in the past. This is why he first turned 
to Uber Eats and Postmates as a quick way to make money for the shelter 
contribution and child support, doing food delivery for about two weeks 
until shelter management informed him that app-based food delivery 
did not constitute a ‘real job’ because it had no set hours. At the end of 
his rope, he decided to try his luck with Handy and, to his surprise, the 
company took him on board.
The ‘onboarding’ process, as gig companies call it in order to avoid 
the appearance of hiring workers, was quick and smooth: “You don’t 
meet nobody at Handy,” Kenny says, and he was pleasantly surprised 
that he only had to answer five easy questions about cleaning situations. 
“Once you pass the test then they tell you to download the app and then 
they’ll be like ‘Hey take some jobs because we gonna need some money 
from you’.” While he, for unknown reasons, was not charged the usual 
background-check fee, Handy did send him a starter kit with cleaning 
supplies for which they took $50 out of his first pay cheque. When asked 
if he thinks the company should have given him these supplies, Kenny 
gives me a smile communicating amused incredulity and brings up his 
independent contractor status as if this should nip the discussion in the 
bud: of course he is responsible for these costs, just like he’s responsible for 
his own healthcare insurance. This situation doesn’t worry him though, 
as he is still on Medicaid – despite officially exceeding the income cap 
– and at least he can always count on Handy to give him work: “Like, 
when you first look at the app and then they say you’re good, they show 
you work! You can get to work, get paid and get money in your pocket.” 
Starting at $15 an hour, he quickly managed to work himself up to the 
$20 tier and is keen on staying there. Kenny feels like he’s got it made: 
“It’s the best thing that’s ever happened to me […] I mean you’ve got 
your freedom, you do what you do, you meet new people, I’m out here 
talking to you, having lunch.” Compared to his previous jobs, Handy 
offers him an unprecedented sense of freedom and control over his own 
schedule. When a cleaning falls through he can even go home early and 
“indulge” in some weed, without having to worry about getting fired 
over a urine test – something he always had to be vigilant about during 
his days as a customer service representative. Ultimately, “it’s the cash and 
the flexibility” that make this platform such a great opportunity for him.
While he loves this work, Kenny acknowledges that there’s quite some 
risk involved in operating via Handy’s platform and he has, over time, 
found ways to either hedge against this risk or absorb it in an attempt to 
turn it into a new business opportunity. He has noticed how more clients 
appear to be frustrated with Handy or previous cleaners these days, how 
they frequently cancel or try to reschedule at the last minute, how some 
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try to scam their way to a free cleaning, and how Handy usually sides with 
the client rather than with its Pro in cases of dispute. These experiences 
have taught him the importance of taking screenshots. Because “Handy 
has to see it to believe it”, Kenny’s phone is loaded with screenshots ready 
to be attached to e-mails providing evidence for his claims, activities and 
whereabouts. This practice is essential because Handy regularly deletes job 
documentation from the app. Kenny was once fined for a ‘no show’ even 
though he was 15 minutes early and called the disgruntled client on the 
number that was left on a note outside when communication via the app 
didn’t work. Wanting to prove his communication attempts, he turned to 
his app, only to find that Handy had already deleted the job information: 
“But I had his number still, that I called on my cellphone. So I erased 
all my other contacts, like all the people I had called, and sent them the 
thing [screenshot] saying ‘Hey I called the guy and he did not want your 
service’.” After much hassle back and forth, Handy finally retracted the 
$50 fine and since then he’s been meticulously screenshotting his jobs.
Nevertheless, screenshots cannot protect him against all the risks that 
are unevenly distributed on Handy’s platform. When Kenny accepts a 
new client, he usually has little information regarding the size of the 
home or the cleaning specifications, as clients are not required to share 
these details. In practice this means that he is often confronted with a 
workload that exceeds his booked time and with ‘extras’ (that is, tasks with 
an additional charge) that weren’t requested through the app. Instead of 
asking clients to add such extras so that he can be properly reimbursed 
or just declining these tasks, he has an alternative strategy: “Another Pro 
may say they need the money or something. I don’t need nothing, I 
just need your repeat business, we good.” Kenny is willing to absorb the 
risk offloaded on him by Handy and take small financial hits as long as 
this “investment” pays off in the long run. Not only does a portfolio of 
repeat clients offer a steadier income stream, it also reduces the risk and 
stress inherent to dealing with new clients: “I just don’t want to have to 
be searching for jobs every day because that gets frustrating.” As Kenny 
and his peers know, labour platforms may lower transaction costs on the 
demand side, yet this often happens at the expense of those supplying the 
commoditized labour. Faced with rising costs, they seek to create a stable 
routine and/or to shift their transactions (back) to the informal economy 
that shields them from platform surveillance and rent seeking.
Kenny’s livelihood depends on his cleaning work, which he considers 
not just his job but a “career” despite how “people talk shit” about him 
cleaning toilets. Given that Handy has played such a formative role in 
this career, I was surprised when I heard him dismiss the company as 
“nothing but that stupid platform”. I think this remark reflects how he 
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was trying to make himself less dependent on Handy’s platform, which 
he now approached as merely a lead generator that connects him to new 
clients but otherwise mostly extracts value (in the form of commissions) 
rather than adding it. “At this point,” he told me, “I am riding with them 
because I could take all their customers. Like I have two, three outside that 
I got through Handy.” He never solicits his clients directly, but has started 
mentioning how much Handy takes from each transaction, and when they 
show interest he suggests a better deal for both parties. One technology 
that really helps his “side hustle” is Cash App, a mobile payment service 
that he uses as a financial interface between him and his private clients, 
who usually “don’t like cash”. He, on the other hand, loves cash, and Cash 
App comes with a debit card that he uses to cash out after clients have 
transferred the money via the app. Handy, which knows how important 
daily payments are for many of its Pros, also initiated an instant cash out 
option, but it charges $3 per transaction – too much, if you ask Kenny.
Still, he uses the option frequently, just like he continues to work with 
Handy as long as he’s “getting the better end of the deal”. For him, this 
means being able to make a decent living while enjoying his freedom, 
maintaining his regulars but increasingly adding private clients to his 
portfolio because this keeps the expensive middleman out. Otherwise, 
the distinction between formal and informal work is not that clear in 
Kenny’s world, which is largely due to Handy’s selective formalization of 
the job. While it adds a digital payment system, standardized performance 
metrics and work documentation tools, it also systematically erases this 
documentation, and its metrics render the working conditions of its Pros 
highly insecure. Furthermore, while it issues a 1099 tax form to all Pros 
earning over $600 per year, it doesn’t offer tax information or enforce 
payment. This suits Kenny well, as he’s trying to stay under the radar of 
the Internal Revenue Service now that his child support contributions 
for two of his children have ended and he’s finally making good money. 
“Nobody digs into my money mess with Handy,” he says, and when I 
mention the possibility of a tax audit his response – while tongue in cheek 
– made my heart sink: “I mean, I am probably going to jail at some point 
[pauses]… at least things are good on Handy’s end.”
A stopgap measure: Kostas’s lament
Although Helpling does not deploy a tiered wage system for its cleaners, 
like Handy, it still enforces wage discipline. It does so by engineering an 
evaluative infrastructure generating what could be called a ‘customer public 
sphere’, in which clients are collectively empowered to compare cleaners’ 
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profiles based on ratings, reviews and prices, in order to establish the best 
value for their money (cf. Kornberger et al, 2017; Ticona and Mateescu, 
2018). I emphasize ‘collectively’ here because this arrangement does not 
just serve the individual client but empowers all members of the ‘customer 
class’ – that is, the structurally advantaged side of Helpling’s marketplace – 
insofar as it aggregates pertinent market information that can be consulted 
and contributed to by everyone belonging to this class (cf. Flanagan, 
2019). Moreover, this information is also available to cleaners themselves, 
prompting vigilance and making price-based competition much more 
prevalent on Helpling than in informal home-cleaning markets whose 
distributed interfaces haven’t been centrally configured in favour of the 
demand side. Just ask Kostas, a 28-year-old Greek man who had come 
to Berlin two years previously for an extended holiday after finishing his 
degree in interior architecture and had – often reluctantly – stuck around 
after getting involved with someone. Like many young migrants in Berlin, 
he soon found out that the city’s living costs are high while the chances 
of finding decent work are slim when you do not speak German. Faced 
with limited options and realizing that his financial situation was getting 
dire, he took a friend’s advice and signed up with Helpling. Although he 
acknowledges that the platform has offered him quick and easy access to 
money, he increasingly resents the high commission the company charges 
on each job he completes. He also feels frustrated by certain changes to 
the platform since he’s been active, particularly when cleaners began to 
be able to set their own rates:
‘When I started the job I made €11 [per hour], but if you are 
new in the job you don’t know how much cleaners charged 
before. Even if you [charge] €9 it’s okay because you don’t 
know how the market works in Berlin. So you can ask for less 
money. But if I am working in the company for more than a 
year and I have really good reviews …’
With a 4.8 rating and over 400 completed cleanings, Kostas feels like he 
should be able to charge more than newcomers. But because Helpling 
allows cleaners to set their hourly rate (after commission) as low as €7.50,11 
he fears a race to the bottom in which more cleaners will feel compelled 
to decrease their rates in order to stay competitive in an environment 
where high ratings and good reviews are the norm rather than the 
exception. In this sense, the ‘evaluative inflation’ on the platform forces 
cleaners to compete on price instead of quality, in a market for labour 
that may be less fungible than food delivery but is nonetheless routinely 
subject to commoditization. Kostas believes that Helpling should raise 
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its wage floor and do more to discourage new cleaners from charging 
less than €11. Not only have the costs of living gone up, he argues, 
but you also have to take into account that you have to pay for your 
own insurances as a self-employed cleaner, which is something Helpling 
doesn’t sufficiently bring to people’s attention. When I note that the 
platform at least offers price recommendations based on ‘cleaners with 
similar profiles’, he counters that these recommendations are exactly the 
problem because they show how low a lot of people are willing to go. 
In other words, rather than operating purely in a prescriptive manner, 
this device is at once descriptive of segmented price-setting behaviour and 
performative insofar as it influences this very behaviour: if you set your rate 
below the recommended margins you may get more work (Espeland and 
Sauder, 2007).
Besides the price-setting system, Kostas thinks that Helpling’s 
Performance Score (which at the time purported to measure cleaners’ 
quality, reliability and communication) also contributes to the degradation 
of working conditions on the platform. Before its implementation he 
could cancel a client 48 hours in advance without repercussions, but 
now any cancellation lowers the score on the metric of reliability, and 
if that drops below a certain threshold his account could be temporarily 
blocked. He doesn’t just experience this new measure as an infringement 
on his freedom to call in sick or protect himself from bad clients, but also 
finds it offensive because he believes that his quality or reliability cannot 
and should not be measured in such an impersonal way. To him, the score 
rather measures Helpling’s lack of trust in its cleaners and its eagerness to 
please its customer base. Performance scores, reviews and starred ratings 
offer control to clients while putting more pressure on cleaners to keep 
up their metrics and keep down their prices, in order to appeal to the 
all-seeing eye of Helpling’s prudent customer class. In this setting, Kostas 
is happy that his regular customers offer a measure of protection against 
the growing work insecurity induced by the platform.
Since his arrival in Berlin, Kostas has been depending on a European 
travel insurance to cover any healthcare costs that he might incur, although 
he is not quite sure how much it actually covers or if it covers him while 
working in people’s homes. He went with this option because he’s not 
able to afford the notoriously expensive German health insurance for 
freelancers, which is why he wants Helpling to contribute to its cleaners’ 
insurance costs. This is just one of his many grievances with the company, 
which by now he cannot wait to leave because he feels that “they don’t 
give a shit about you”. Still, he continues to work through Helpling 
because he likes his regulars and he needs the money. He has also noticed 
that many German clients are hesitant to break Helpling’s rules by taking 
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him off the platform, and they don’t realize that the company takes a 
cut from his wages. On a couple of occasions clients did solicit him 
with a reasonable offer, however, which he gladly accepted because it’s 
more money in his pocket and he does not think he needs the platform 
anymore (echoing Kenny). While it has given him market access, it has 
provided nothing in terms of income or social security, and it ultimately 
even ruined this market for him. There was a time when he still had 
the good faith and energy to work on earning the trust of his platform-
mediated customers, but these days Kostas feels tired. He is tired not just 
of Helpling but of cleaning work more generally, of Berlin and of living 
in Germany. His heart yearns for Athens and he really wants to work 
in a field where he can put his degree and skills to good use. While he 
realizes the difficulty of finding a job back in Greece, given the present 
circumstances, he also wonders how hard it can be compared to his 
experience in Berlin. At least he speaks the language there.
Although he’s still on the platform, Kostas acts like he already checked 
out. In contrast to Kenny, he has nothing good to say about the cleaning 
platform he has used for nearly two years: “If it wasn’t Helpling, it would 
have been another platform or something more creative. I can’t feel 
grateful for Helpling because I’m doing all the work.” While doing all 
this work, he allowed himself to fall “into the hole of Helpling”, which 
he now regrets. He just got too comfortable in this hole, which shielded 
him from Berlin’s disappointing labour market prospects, but now he is 
determined to pull himself out of it and move on with his life.12
Discussion and conclusion
In the context of an ‘acute confluence of austerity, diminishing public 
welfare, and fragmentation of formal employment’ (Thieme, 2018, p 529), 
domestic labour platforms like Handy and Helpling can offer an important 
economic lifeline to vulnerable labour market ‘outsiders’ such as minorities 
and migrants. Yet what initially constitutes a stepping stone or stopgap 
opportunity eventually becomes – or threatens to become, if one doesn’t 
continue to step up – a dead end. In cities where, for many inhabitants, 
‘crises become unexceptional, and where coping with uncertainty is 
normalized’ (Thieme, 2018, p 530), these outsiders develop a ‘hustle’ 
at once enabled and thwarted by platforms that constantly experiment 
with labour-market governance and segmentation while operating on 
the cusp of formality and informality (cf. Van Doorn and Velthuis, 2018; 
Ravenelle, 2019). Improvisation, in this sense, comes from both sides, 
although information asymmetries and other data-driven instruments 
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of structural domination regularly give domestic labour platforms and 
their customers the upper hand (Flanagan, 2019). Moreover, the previous 
section demonstrated that the opportunities and challenges of platform 
labour are unevenly distributed and some workers are better positioned 
than others to absorb the risks/costs attendant to platform companies’ 
selective formalization of the labour relation and process.
Kostas initially perceived Berlin less as the origin of Greece’s post-
crisis suffering and more as a destination imbued with the possibilities 
of a temporary reprieve. His dismissive attitude toward Helpling and 
platform-mediated domestic work stems as much from his educational and 
professional trajectories in Greece – co-constitutive of his gendered class 
identity – as from his imagined prospects in Berlin or another European 
city. After all, as a European citizen Kostas is more mobile than non-EU 
migrants or refugees (Könönen, 2019), especially given that he doesn’t 
have any dependents to care for: if Berlin doesn’t work out, he can always 
return home or try again elsewhere. So, while he occupies an outsider 
status on Berlin’s labour market, primarily due to his struggles with the 
German language, Kostas has accumulated enough ‘human capital’ to 
treat Helpling as little more than a stopgap that holds him over until he 
finds something better. In this position of relative privilege, the costs 
and insecurities of platform-governed self-employment are reluctantly 
accepted as a passing burden, such as when Kostas relies on his cheap travel 
insurance as a provisional healthcare solution. Conversely, Kenny’s reliance 
on Medicaid is less of a provisional solution and more of a protracted 
predicament. Likewise, his job mobility is restricted, due to his criminal 
record, while his kids will need his support for years to come. For Kenny, 
faced with limited funds and mobility, New York is closer to destiny 
than destination. He has to roll with the punches and has more to lose – 
but also more to gain – than Kostas, which explains his entrepreneurial 
approach to domestic cleaning and his readiness to build on what Handy 
has made available. However, it is exactly what Handy is not making 
available, namely a formal set of resources that can support and educate 
Kenny as well as other precarious independent contractors with respect to 
tax compliance, that threatens to eventually disrupt his entire livelihood. 
Beyond individual biographies and labour-market trajectories, the long 
history of institutional racism and mass incarceration of African Americans 
in the US positions Kenny as a de facto outsider in his own country 
despite his formal citizenship, intensifying his vulnerability to Handy’s 
selective formalization of his labour.
Finally, on a more general note, to emphasize that platform labour is 
primarily migrant and minority labour matters insofar as it recalibrates 
the parameters for a critical discussion about how and to what extent ‘the 
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gig economy’ exerts a downward pull on labour conditions and erodes 
the norms, standards and protections scaffolding ‘regular employment’ 
(for example, Daugareilh et al, 2019). While certainly not denying such 
dynamics, I believe that claims regarding the degradation of labour by 
gig platforms tend to mobilize a comparative frame of reference that has 
little bearing on the everyday circumstances of many gig workers and 
indeed is increasingly belied by the practices and logics of neoliberal 
labour-market governance. It is evident that we did not have to wait 
until the advent of gig platforms to witness the decline of the standard 
employment relation in various sectors, or the massive expansion of 
low-wage, insecure jobs (for example, Crouch, 2019). Platforms, as 
amplifiers, have a structural tendency to accelerate and scale the labour-
market dynamics and arrangements that have been over four decades 
in the making, thereby crystallizing existing problems now subjected 
to a resurgence of public scrutiny that is often too narrowly focused 
on platform culpability. Although this scrutiny is justified and useful, 
it is equally justified and useful to scrutinize our own assessments and 
aspirations with respect to platform labour. Are we expecting this type of 
work to be better than traditional forms of precarious work just because 
it is governed by a platform? When we judge platform labour to be 
‘degraded’, what do we compare it to (Doussard, 2013)? As I have shown, 
for minority and migrant workers whose experience with and short-term 
prospects for finding a ‘decent’ job with proper protections and pay are 
minimal at best, gig work can present a provisional step up rather than 
down. Yet I have also demonstrated how working conditions and income 
opportunities on the platform tend to deteriorate over time, suggesting 
that labour degradation is more salient as a problem internal to platforms 
– as companies seek scale and profitability – than in comparison to other 
industry actors. Moreover, the broader point is that nobody should 
have to choose between a rock and a hard place. Instead of raising our 
norms and expectations solely with respect to platform labour, we should 
collectively raise the bar on non-standard work and social security in post-
welfare societies by organizing and legislating for higher wages, broader 
protections, more enforcement capacities and a robust, redistributive social 
safety net. This would present ‘gig economy’ companies with a new status 
quo: either follow suit or close shop following a worker exodus.
Notes
1 See https://www.handy.com/locations.
2 See, respectively, https://www.handy.com/services/cleaning-service and https://
www.handy.com/apply.
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3 In 2015, Handy claimed that it charges ‘about 20 per cent on the average booking’ 
(see https://slate.com/business/2015/07/handy-a-hot-startup-for-home-cleaning-
has-a-big-mess-of-its-own.html). However, numerous Handy Pros claim this 






7 This research is part of a five-year project entitled Platform Labor, funded by the 
European Research Council. It investigates how digital platforms are transforming 
low-wage labour, social reproduction and urban governance in post-welfare 
societies, zooming in on NYC, Amsterdam and Berlin. For more information 
about the project, see https://platformlabor.net.
8 See https://www.berlin.de/sen/wirtschaft/en/about-us/artikel.458761.en.php.
9 See https://www.helpling.de/anmelden.
10 In order to do justice to the richness and complexity of cleaners’ experiences 
with these platforms within the given space constraints, I have opted to zoom 
in on one cleaner per city. I have selected these two cleaners because their 
socioeconomic backgrounds and experiences are in many ways representative of 
the total sample of cleaners interviewed in each city. Although the majority of the 
cleaners interviewed in NYC were female, Kenny’s narrative aptly represents the 
entrepreneurialism, lack of better job opportunities and childcare responsibilities 
that were prevalent themes in the interviews and in informal conversations I had 
in this city. Meanwhile, Kostas’s experience as a well-educated Greek migrant in 
Berlin is representative of the relatively large share of highly skilled migrant men 
(and women) who work through Helpling in this city, and of their disassociation 
with the role of domestic cleaner.
11 Helpling has since raised the minimum rate to €10 per hour in Germany.
12 A few months after this conversation, Kostas informed me that he and his boyfriend 
were moving back to Athens to pursue new job opportunities there.
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